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DID "THREE STRIKES" CAUSE THE RECENT
DROP IN CALIFORNIA CRIME?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CALIFORNIA
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT
Linda S. Beres* and Thomas D. Griffith**
In March 1994 the California legislature enacted "Three Strikes"
legislation that provided for 25-years-to-life sentences for offenders
with two prior serious or violent felony convictions who are con-
victed of a third felony, whether or not the third felony is serious or
violent.' The Three Strikes legislation also provided for substantially
longer sentences for offenders with one prior serious or violent fel-
ony conviction who are convicted of a second felony of any type.z In
November 1994 the California voters passed a nearly identical Three
Strikes initiative.3
In March 1998 the California Attorney General's office issued
Three Strikes and You're Out-Its Impact on the California Criminal
Justice System After Four Years.4 The Attorney General's report
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School.
** John B. Milliken Professor of Taxation, University of Southern Cali-
fornia Law School. The authors would like to thank Charisse Smith for her
excellent research assistance.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1998).
2. See id.
3. See id. § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1998) (codifying voter initiative). All
citations to the Three Strikes legislation are to the statute passed by the legis-
lature. For a discussion of the history of both statutes, see Michael Vitiello,
"Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democ-
racy, 30 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 1643 (1997).
4. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE
OUT"--ITS IMPACT ON THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AFTER
FOUR YEARS (visited April 10, 1998) <http://caag.state.ca.us/piu/3strikes/
threestrikes.html>. A copy of this report obtained from the Office of the At-
torney General is on file with the authors. Page numbers on copies obtained
from the Internet may differ from those used in this article.
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102 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:101
(AGR) argues that Three Strikes is largely responsible for the "larg-
est overall drop in crime over any four-year period in [California]
history." 5 In this article we examine this argument and, more gener-
ally, discuss the relationship between Three Strikes and the recent
decline in California's crime rate. We conclude that there is no evi-
dence that Three Strikes played an important role in the drop in the
crime rate. Moreover, to the extent that Three Strikes might have
contributed to crime reduction, it did so by deterring potential of-
fenders rather than by incapacitating those convicted of an offense.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA THREE STRIKES STATUTE
The California Three Strikes law targets felony offenders who
previously have been convicted of one or more qualifying "serious"
or "violent" felonies.6 These previous convictions are commonly re-
ferred to as "prior strikes." The law sharply enhances sentences for
such offenders upon subsequent conviction for any felony.7 It also
limits the ability of such offenders to reduce their time served
through the accumulation of credits for work or good behavior in
prison.
8
5. Id. at 2.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)-(d) (West Supp. 1998); see also id. §
667.5(c) (West Supp. 1998) (listing violent felonies); id. § 1192.7(c) (West
Supp. 1998) (listing serious felonies).
7. See id. § 667. In California, a felony is any crime punishable by im-
prisonment in the state prison or by death. See id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1998).
A misdemeanor is any other crime except those public offenses classified as
infractions. See id. Many criminal offenses, however, fall into the category
known as "wobblers." These are crimes that are not statutorily defined as ei-
ther felonies or misdemeanors. Whether a wobbler will be considered a felony
or misdemeanor in a particular case depends upon the prosecutor's charging
decision and the actual punishment imposed by the trial court. See id. § 17(b)
(West Supp. 1998) (describing circumstances under which such crimes are
considered misdemeanors); see also Loren L. Barr, Comment, The "Three
Strikes" Dilemma: Crime Reduction at Any Price?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
107, 117-19 (1995) (describing prosecutorial discretion in charging a wobbler
as a felony and the authority of the trial court to then reduce it to a misde-
meanor). A large number of crimes qualify as wobblers including petty theft
with a prior petty theft or felony conviction. See id. at 117 n.9 1.
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5) (West Supp. 1998); see also id. §
2933.1 (a) (limiting the worktime credits).
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The most highly publicized section is the "third strike" provi-
sion. Under this provision an offender who has two prior strikes
must, upon conviction for any felony, be sentenced to a minimum
term of 25-years-to-life.9 Thus, while the two prior strikes must be
violent or serious felonies, the third strike that triggers the provision
can be a non-serious or non-violent felony such as possession of a
small amount of drugs' ° or petty theft with a prior felony. 1
Less well publicized is the "two strikes" provision, which re-
quires that an offender with one prior strike must receive a doubled
sentence upon subsequent conviction for any felony.' 2 Thus, while
the first strike must be a serious or violent felony, the second strike
that triggers this provision can be a non-serious or non-violent fel-
ony. Second strike cases are eight times more common than third
strike cases.13
Both second and third strike offenders must serve their sentences
in prison 14 and must serve at least 80% of their sentences15
9. See id. § 667(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1998). There are presently over 500
offenses classified as felonies in California. See Michael D. Harris, Garcetti
Calls for New 3-Strikes Law, L.A. DAILY J., June 9, 1994, at 2 (noting that
more than 500 felonies qualify as third strikes); see generally CALIFORNIA
CTR. FOR JUDICIAL EDUC. AND RESEARCH, 1997 CJER FELONY SENTENCING
HANDBOOK (Bancroft Whitney 1997) (listing crimes defined as felonies and
the corresponding sentences).
10. As of July 31, 1998, simple drug possession accounted for 20.1% of
second strikes and 9.6% of third strikes. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT,
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, SECOND STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY
DATE, (July 31, 1998) [hereinafter SECOND STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY
DATE] (giving data for second strike cases) (on file with the authors); DATA
ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THIRD STRIKE CASES
BY DELIVERY DATE, (July 31, 1998) [hereinafter THIRD STRIKE CASES BY
DELIVERY DATE] (giving data for third strike cases) (on file with the authors).
11. As of July 31, 1998, petty theft with a prior accounted for 10.7% of
second strikes and 5.4% of third strikes. See SECOND STRIKE CASES BY
DELIVERY DATE, supra note 10 (giving data for second strike cases); THIRD
STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra note 10 (giving data for third strike
cases).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
13. As of July 31, 1998, a total of 4,468 offenders had been imprisoned un-
der the third strike provisions. See THIRD STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE,
supra note 10. A total of 36,043 offenders had been imprisoned under the sec-
ond strike provisions. See SECOND STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra
note 10.
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c)(4) (West Supp. 1998).
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Consequently, such offenders will have to serve a greater percentage
of their sentences than will offenders convicted of similar crimes
who have no such record of prior strikes.16
II. THE ARGUMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT
The AGR's claim that Three Strikes caused the recent sharp
drop in the California crime rate is largely based on timing. The
AGR argues that crime dropped much more sharply following Three
Strikes than before its enactment, and that alternative explanations,
such as improvements in the economy and demographic changes,
cannot explain this decline. Therefore, the AGR contends, Three
Strikes must be the cause.
17
We begin our examination of the AGR's argument by looking at
the claim that the drop in the California crime rate began with the en-
actment of Three Strikes.
A. Did the Drop in the California Crime Rate Begin with
Three Strikes?
1. Measuring the crime rate
The most commonly used measure of the level of criminal ac-
tivity is the FBI Crime Index.' 8  This index is comprised of four
15. See id. § 667(c)(5) (West Supp. 1998).
16. See id. Prior to the 1994 enactment of this legislation, felons given de-
terminate sentences could earn enough "worktime" credits to reduce their
prison terms up to 50%. See id. § 2933. Felons given indeterminate, or life
sentences, could earn "goodtime" credits to reduce their minimum prison terms
up to 33%. See id. § 2931. These provisions still apply to convicted felons
with no record of prior strikes. Those with prior strikes, however, can reduce
their sentences only by a maximum of 20%. See id. § 667(c)(5); see also id. §
2933.1(a) (limiting the worktime credits that can be earned by those convicted
of violent felonies to 15%).
17. The AGR also briefly suggests that other new law enforcement prac-
tices such as community policing might have contributed to the decline in
crime. See AGR, supra note 4, at 12. However, the report does not give any
details or further analysis of these practices.
18. The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program is administered by the
FBI to measure and generate statistical information on crime rates and trends in
the nation. The FBI compiles the statistics in the UCR from arrest data volun-
tarily submitted by more than 16,000 law enforcement agencies. Eight of-
fenses, or "Index Crimes," are used to measure annual changes in the volume
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"violent crimes"---murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery and aggravated assault-and four "property crimes"--
burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny-theft and arson.'9 The AGR,
however, generally uses the California Crime Index (CCI) as its
benchmark of the level of crime in the state.20 This index is identical
to the FBI index except that it excludes the property crimes of arson
and larceny-theft.2'
Both the CCI and FBI indexes understate the actual level of
criminal activity because they include only reported crimes.
22
and rate of crime. The term "Crime Index" refers to the aggregation of these
offenses. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, at 1 (1996) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S.
1996].
19. Id. at 10, 35. Arson was not included as an index crime until 1979. See
id. at 1, 61. The reporting of arson offenses since then has been incomplete.
See id. at 1, 54.
20. See DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES,
CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA
(1996) [hereinafter CRIME & DELINQUENCY]. CRIME & DELINQUENCY is pub-
lished annually and contains detailed statistical information about crime in
California. The California Department of Justice obtains its figures for the
CCI from the FBI's UCR Program. Except where otherwise indicated, data on
California crime in this report are taken directly from CRIME & DELINQUENCY
for the relevant years or are calculated by the authors using data contained in
CRIME & DELINQUENCY.
21. The omission of arson has little impact on the CCI because relatively
few arsons have been reported under the UCR program. See CRIME IN THE
U.S. 1996, supra note 18, at 114-19 tbl.8 (showing inclusion of arson data
would not change significantly the 1996 FBI Crime Index totals for areas in
California with populations exceeding 10,000); see also id. at 187-88 tbl.12
(showing inclusion of arson data would not change the 1995-1996 Crime Index
total for offenses known to police and categorized by population group). The
omission of larceny-theft, on the other hand, is more significant since it ac-
counts for such a large proportion of the FBI Crime Index total. See id. at 62
tbl.1 (reporting data showing that for each year from 1977-1996 larceny-theft
has comprised more than half of the FBI Crime Index total). Nonetheless, the
analysis in this article would not be greatly affected by including larceny-theft
data. The trend for larceny-theft has been similar to that of the FBI Crime In-
dex total for the years 1986-1996, although the magnitude of the change for
each year was less sharp. See id. (showing that both increased each year from
1986-1991, decreased each year from 1991-1994, and decreased from 1995-
1996). The only year in which the trends differed was 1994-1995, when the
FBI Crime Index total decreased while larceny-theft increased slightly. See id.
22. See DARYL A. HELLMAN & NEIL 0. ALPER, ECONOMICS OF CRIME 5
(4th ed. 1997); see also DAVID J. ROBERTS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
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Changes in the index crime rate may be due to changes in reporting
practices rather than to changes in the number of crimes committed.23
Nevertheless, the CCI and FBI indexes provide a useful measure of
changes in the level of criminal activity. In our analysis we will fol-
low the AGR and focus on changes in the CCI. Our conclusions
would not be significantly altered, however, if we adopted the
broader FBI index.24
2. Did the drop in the California crime rate begin with Three Strikes?
The AGR claims that the "dramatic drop in the crime rate" oc-
curred after the passage of Three Strikes.25 To demonstrate this, the
AGR compares changes in the crime rate from 1990-1993, the years
immediately preceding the adoption of Three Strikes, with changes
from 1994-1997, the three years after the adoption of the statute.26
The report states that during the pre-Three Strikes years 1990-
1993, the overall CCI dropped by only 2.4% as compared to a post-
Three Strikes drop of 30.8% from 1994-1997. -7 The difference was
even sharper, the AGR notes, for crimes of violence. Violent of-
fenses increased by 7.3% during the 1990-1993 period, but dropped
by 26.9% from 1994-1997.28 The AGR concludes:
The drop in the crime rate that California has experienced
since 1993 is drastically different from the first four years of
this decade (1990-1993) where the overall crime rate
dropped only 2.4% and the violent crime rate increased
7.3%. While some may argue that the initial drop in crime
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMPLEMENTING THE NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED
REPORTING SYSTEM 3 (1997) (noting that reporting provisions of the UCR
program hide a potentially substantial volume of crime).
23. See HELLMAN & ALPER, supra note 22 (noting that differences in crime
rates may be due to changes in the number of agencies reporting such crimes
or the willingness of victims to report offenses to the police). If, for example,
improvements in the police force make citizens more likely to report crimes,
then the improvements may increase the crime rate as measured by the CCI
and the FBI index even if the improvements reduce the actual level of criminal
activity.
24. See supra notes 18-21.
25. See AGR, supra note 4, at 2.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
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occurred before "Three Strikes," clearly the dramatic
change in California's crime rate started in 1994.29
But did the "the dramatic change" in the crime rate begin after
the 1994 adoption of Three Strikes? An examination of the annual
changes in the California crime rate suggests not. Rather, the decline
in crime began in 1993, one year before the adoption of Three
Strikes. Table 1 shows the annual changes in the California crime
rate from 1988-1996.30
Table 1: Changes in the California Crime Index 1988-1996
Year Total Violent Property
1988 1.0% 0.6% 1.2%
1989 3.5% 5.7% 2.6%
1990 -0.2% 6.9% -3.0%
1991 1.8% 2.3% 1.5%
1992 -0.3% 2.2% -1.5%
1993 -3.5% -4.1% -3.3%
1994 -6.5% -6.3% -6.7%
1995 -6.9% -4.2% -8.2%
1996 -12.6% -10.8% -13.5%
The violent crime rate rose sharply in 1989 and 1990 and rose by
lesser amounts in 1991 and 1992. The pattern reversed in 1993, one
year before Three Strikes, when the violent crime rate declined by
4.1%. The pattern is similar, although less dramatic, with respect to
property crime. After remaining fairly stable from 1989 to 1992, the
property crime rate dropped by 3.3% in 1993. The AGR conceals the
fact that the violent crime rate began to fall the year before Three
Strikes was adopted by lumping the year 1993 with the years 1990-
1992 when the violent crime rate rose.
31
29. Id.
30. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
31. There is no mention in the text of the AGR that the crime rate dropped
in 1993. The AGR does present a graph showing the California crime rate
from 1970-1997, but the graph is cross-hatched only at 5-year intervals, mak-
ing it difficult to determine the precise year in which a change took place. See
AGR, supra note 4, at 6.
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:101
The fact that the drop in the California crime rate began a year
before Three Strikes does not prove, of course, that Three Strikes did
not lower the crime rate. Similarly, the fact that the crime rate
continued to drop after the adoption of Three Strikes does not prove
that Three Strikes caused the continuing reduction in crime.32 Nev-
ertheless, contrary to the assertions of the AGR, crime in Califor-
nia-including violent crime-began to drop one year before Three
Strikes.
III. UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE CRIME RATE
An alternative explanation for the recent drop in crime is the
booming California economy. Perhaps improved legitimate job op-
portunities reduced the attractiveness of criminal activity. Under this
theory, a drop in the unemployment rate should produce a drop in
crime. Figure 1 shows California's unemployment and violent crime
rates for the years 1989-1996.33
For six of the seven years, the unemployment and violent crime
rates each moved in the same direction.34 Each rate rose from 1989
to 1992 and fell from 1994 to 1996. The only exception is 1993
when unemployment rose from 9.3% to 9.4% while violent crime
dropped by 3.7%.
The AGR treats the fact that crime dropped in the years follow-
ing the enactment of Three Strikes as strong evidence that Three
Strikes caused the drop. But the fact that the violent crime rate rose
and dropped with the unemployment rate did not lead the AGR to
conclude that an improved California economy played an important
role in crime reduction. Instead, the AGR argues that the impact of
an improved economy is "minimal compared to changes in criminal
law and law enforcement." 35 The AGR points out that changes in the
32. Violent crime dropped by 6.3% in 1994, 4.2% in 1995, and 10.8% in
1996, and property crime showed similar reductions. See CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
33. For unemployment data, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LOCAL
AREA UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS (last modified July 30, 1998)
<http://stats.bls.govlaunews1.htm>. For violent crime rate data, see CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
34. The correlation between California's unemployment rate and violent
'crime rate for the period from 1989-1996 was 0.428.
35. AGR, supra note 4, at 6.
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unemployment rate have not correlated with changes in the crime
rate in other years. The report notes, for example, that crime dropped
during a recession in the early 1980s and that crime remained un-
changed during a recession in the early 1990s.
36
Figure 1: California Unemployment and Violent Crime
-*-Violent Crime Rate - Unemployment Rate
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The same argument, however, might be applied to crime bills
like Three Strikes. During the 1980s California enacted various "get
tough" laws that led to an unprecedented explosion of the inmate
population.37 In the ten years from 1982 to 1992, the institutional
population grew from 32,152 to 104,352.38 Despite more than tri-
pling the prison population, the overall crime rate remained virtually
unchanged, the violent crime rate increased by over 35%, and the
homicide rate increased by almost 12%.39 Following the reasoning
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Marcus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of
Offenders: A Critique of California's Habitual Criminal Statute, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 193, 197-98 (1990) (discussing the 1982 passage of Proposition 8 that
amended the California Penal Code and the California Constitution).
38. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1993 & 1994, at 11 tbl.3 [hereinafter
PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1993 & 1994].
39. The CCI total crime rate decreased from 3,500.4 in 1982 to 3,491.5 in
1992, a change of less than three-tenths of one percent. The CCI violent crime
November 1998]
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of the AGR, it could be concluded that tougher sentences have only a
"minimal" impact on the crime rate.4 0
Such a conclusion, however, may be unjustified. Although vio-
lent crime increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s despite
tougher penalties, it is possible that the rise in violent crime would
have been even greater if penalties had not increased. Similarly, the
fact that the unemployment rate and the crime rate do not always
move together does not mean that unemployment has little impact on
the crime rate. Many factors influence the crime rate, making it dif-
ficult to isolate the impact of any one.
The scholarly evidence on the impact of economic prosperity on
the crime rate is mixed. Some scholars have argued that little con-
nection exists.4 1 But there is also scholarly evidence that economic
opportunities may have a significant impact on crime.42 Criminal of-
fenders are disproportionately comprised of individuals who have a
limited earning potential in the legitimate labor market.43 Increases
in the unemployment rate are associated with increases in crime.
44
Individuals engaged in serious violent behavior are more likely to
rate increased from 814.7 in 1982 to 1,103.9 in 1992. The California homicide
rate increased from 11.2 in 1982 to 12.5 in 1992. See CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
40. Not surprisingly, some opponents of increased incarceration have made
this argument. See, e.g., Mimi Silbert, Wrong Way to Get Tough, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1994, at 19.
41. The AGR quotes from a 1995 speech by Professor James Q. Wilson to
support its position that economic prosperity has little impact on crime. See
AGR, supra note 4, at 6. For a transcript of the speech see James Q. Wilson,
What To DoAbout Crime (Jan. 19, 1995), in 61 VITAL SPEECHES 373 (1995).
42. An excellent summary and analysis of this literature is contained in
Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit Crimes
and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (1996); see also
Theodore G. Chiricos, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis ofAg-
gregate Research Evidence, 34 SOCIAL PROBS. 187, 192 (1987) (noting that in
63 studies surveyed a positive relationship between unemployment and crime
was found three times more often than a negative relationship).
43. See Freeman, supra note 42, at 33.
44. See Chiricos, supra note 42, at 187-212; Richard B. Freeman, Crime
and Unemployment, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 89-106 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1983) [hereinafter Freeman, Crime and Unemployment]; Richard B. Free-
man, The Labor Market, in CRIME 171-91 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia
eds., 1995) [hereinafter Freeman, Labor Market]; Freeman, supra note 42, at
33.
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stop this behavior if they are employed.4 5 Higher crime rates have
been found to be associated with greater levels of economic inequal-
ity.
46
Evidence of a connection between economic opportunity and the
crime rate is particularly important in light of the deterioration of the
market for unskilled labor during the past two decades. For low skill
workers, real wages have declined by an estimated 20%-30% since
the mid-1970s.47 During the same period, unemployment in many
segregated inner city neighborhoods rose dramatically.48 While the
precise impact of these changes in the labor market on the crime
level is far from certain, it seems reasonable to believe it is more than
,,minima ,,49
Our discussion of the impact of the labor market on the crime
rate was not designed, however, to show that an improved economy
was the main reason for the recent sharp drop in the California crime
rate. Rather, we hope to make two points. First, that the same rea-
soning the AGR used to show that Three Strikes caused the drop in
crime could also be used to prove that a reduction in the unemploy-
ment rate was the reason for the drop. Second, that the AGR ignored
scholarly evidence that improved job opportunities may have a sig-
nificant impact on crime.
45. See Freeman, supra note 42, at 33 (citing Delbert Elliot, Longitudinal
Research in Criminology: Promise and Practice, in CROSS NATIONAL
LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR 189-201 (G. W. Westcamp & H. J. Kemer eds., 1994)).
46. See Freeman, supra note 42, at 33.
47. See id. at 30.
48. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 18-20 (1996).
49. One researcher estimated that for young men, a one-percent reduction
in wages produces about a one-percent increase in crimes committed. This es-
timate predicted that the decline in wages that occurred from the mid-1970s to
the late 1980s would lead to a 23% increase in crime by this population. This
estimated increase is close to the actual 18% increase in FBI index crimes
committed by young men during these years. See Freeman, supra note 42, at
34 (citing J. Groger, Criminal Opportunities, Youth Crime, and Young Men's
Labor Supply, mimeo, Department of Economics, University of California,
Santa Barbara, Feb. 1994).
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IV. DISAGGREGATING CALIFORNIA HOMICIDE RATES:
A TALE OF Two TRENDS
The violent crime rate rose in California from 921 per 100,000
population in 1986 to a peak of 1,104 in 1992 before falling to 848 in
1996.50 The homicide rate followed a similar trend, rising from 11.3
in 1986 to a peak of 12.9 in 1993 and then falling to 9.0 in 1996."'
Each crime, then, rose by 10% to 20% and then dropped by 20% to
25% from its peak level.52 These aggregate crime trends conceal,
however, as much as they reveal.
Disaggregated homicide data reveals two trends, rather than
one. 53 Homicides committed by mature offenders and homicides
committed by means other than firearms declined steadily from 1986
through 1996.54 On the other hand, homicides committed by youth-
fal offenders and homicides committed with firearms rose sharply
and then fell just as sharply.55 Figure 2 shows homicide arrests in
California by age group for the ten-year period ending in 1996.56
Homicide arrests of offenders 30 and older dropped fairly stead-
ily throughout the period, falling by over 30% from 1,032 in 1986 to
716 in 1996. Arrests of offenders under the age of 20, however,
more than doubled from 618 in 1986 to 1,307 in 1991 and then
50. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
51. Seeid.
52. Violent crime rose 19.9% before dropping 23.2%. Homicide rose by
13.9% before dropping 20.7%. See id.
53. We focus on homicide statistics in our analysis for two reasons. First,
homicide data is more accurate than other crime statistics. See NATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 4 (Steven R.
Donziger ed., 1996) (noting that citizens quickly report homicides to the police
who then accurately record them). Second, more extensive data is available
regarding homicides than regarding other offenses. See, e.g., CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, supra note 20. Disaggregating other offenses does not lead to
as sharply different trends for different ages as does disaggregating homicide.
The larger difference with respect to homicide is consistent with the focus on
guns as a central reason for the rise of youth homicide rates.
54. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
55. See id.
56. See id. The number of homicide arrests will be different from the num-
ber of homicides committed. For example, some homicides will not lead to an
arrest, and some of those arrested will not be guilty. Moreover, some homi-
cides may involve multiple perpetrators so that more than one offender may be
convicted of a single homicide.
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dropped by almost 40% to 802 in 1996. The pattern of arrests for of-
fenders ages 20-29 was between these two extremes.
57
Figure 2: Homicide Arrests by Age Group
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The sharp rise in youth homicide is closely associated with a
growth in the use of firearms. Figure 3 shows firearm and non-
firearm homicides in California for the ten-year period ending in
1996.58
Non-firearm homicides were cut almost in half, falling steadily
from 4.9 per 100,000 population in 1986 to 2.5 in 1996. Firearm
homicides, on the other hand, grew rapidly during the late 1980s and
early 1990s and plummeted after 1993. National FBI data on the
weapons used in homicides indicates that the rise in firearm use was
a result of an increase in handguns; there was no significant increase
in long-gun homicides.59
57. Arrests of offenders ages 20-29 increased from 1,382 in 1986 to a peak
of 1,624 in 1990 and then dropped to 1,017 in 1996. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Alfred Blumstein & Richard Rosenfeld, Explaining Recent Trends
in U.S. Homicide Rates, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998).
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Firearm use in robberies also increased, although the growth was
not as sharp as in homicides. Firearm robberies increased 72% from
30,256 in 1986 to a peak of 51,901 in 1993 and then dropped to
37,168 in 1996.60 Non-firearm robberies increased by 30% from
62,257 in 1986 to a peak of 80,746 in 1992 before dropping to
56,969 in 1996.61
Figure 3: Homicides by Type of Weapon
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Both the increase and the subsequent fall in homicide arrests
were much larger among African-American and Hispanic youth than
among young Whites. 62 Figure 4 shows homicide arrests by racial
classification for offenders under the age of 20.63
Homicide arrests of African-American youth almost doubled
from 242 in 1986 to a peak of 424 in 1990, and arrests of Hispanic
youth more than tripled from 227 in 1986 to a peak of 705 in 1991.
60. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. These figures are the total number of felony arrests for each
group rather than the felony rate. This overstates the growth in the homicide
arrest rate for each group because it does not consider population growth.
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Homicide arrests of White youth increased by just over 40% from a
low of 102 in 1988 to a high of 144 in 1993.
Figure 4: Homicide Arrests Under 20 Years of Age by
Racial Classification
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The drop in homicide arrests of young African-Americans and
Hispanics during the 1990s was also much sharper than that of young
Whites. By 1996, arrests of African-American youths had dropped
by 53% from their peak,64 arrests of Hispanic youths had dropped by
44%,65 and arrests of White youths had dropped by 24%.66
Homicide arrests of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Whites
age 30 and older, on the other hand, generally remained flat or de-
67clined throughout the period. This is shown in Figure 5. From
1986 to 1996, homicide arrests of older African-Americans dropped
41%,68 arrests of older Hispanics dropped 10%,69 and arrests of older
Whites dropped 39%.70
64. Homicide arrests of African-Americans under the age of 20 dropped
from 424 in 1990 to 200 in 1996.
65. Homicide arrests of Hispanics under the age of 20 dropped from 705 in
1991 to 396 in 1996.
66. Homicide arrests of Whites under the age of 20 dropped from 144 in
1993 to 110 in 1996.
67. See id.
68. Homicide arrests of African-Americans age 30 and older dropped from
293 in 1986 to 173 in 1996.
69. Homicide arrests of Hispanics age 30 and older dropped from 249 in
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Figure 5: Homicide Arrests 30-Plus Years of Age by
Racial Classification
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These trends are not unique to California, but are mirrored na-
tionally, particularly in other states with large urban populations.7'
The nationwide homicide rate for older offenders and for offenders
without guns has been steadily dropping for over a decade while the
homicide rate for young offenders with guns soared and then de-
clined.72 Nationally, as in California, the rise and subsequent fall in
1986 to 224 in 1996. Homicide arrests of older Hispanics rose slightly before
dropping 10% below their 1986 level. See id. The population of Hispanics at
least 30 years old grew by 80% from 1986-1996. See DEMOGRAPHIC
RESEARCH UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF FINANCE, POPULATION TABLES (last
modified Aug. 12, 1998) <http://www.dof.ca.gov/> (authors' calculations from
this data base). Aggregate homicide arrest statistics, therefore, significantly
understate the drop in the homicide rate for old Hispanics.
70. Homicide arrests of White age 30 and older dropped from 433 in 1986
to 266 in 1996.
71. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 59 (noting the difference in
trends between large and small cities).
72. See id. (showing that gun and youth homicide rose sharply in the late
1980s, peaked in the early 1990s, and then dropped sharply by 1996); see also
John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998) (showing same statistics as Blumstein &
Rosenfeld); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale
of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998) (showing
same statistics as Blumstein & Rosenfeld and finding similar trend for robber-
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the homicide rate has been greatest among minority youth.73
Similarly, young minority males also showed the largest increase as
victims of homicide in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and showed
the largest decline in victimization in the mid-1990s.
74
The fact that the rise and later fall in homicides was concen-
trated among minority youth with handguns may help explain the
changes. One plausible explanation, discussed in Part VI, focuses on
the nexus between an emerging crack cocaine market and deteriorat-
ing legitimate economic opportunities in the late 1980s.
V. DID THREE STRIKES CAUSE THE DROP IN CRIME?
A. Incapacitation
Supporters of Three Strikes and other statutes mandating long
sentences for repeat offenders argue that such statutes can reduce
crime by incapacitating "career criminals" and by deterring other
potential offenders. Any influence of Three Strikes on the drop in
crime from 1994-1996, however, must have resulted from deterrence
alone. The reason is simple: most offenders imprisoned under Three
Strikes would have been incarcerated during this period even if Three
Strikes had never been enacted.75
Three Strikes was enacted in March 1994, and had been in op-
eration for less than 34 months by the end of 1996. The sentence en-
hancements of Three Strikes, therefore, would have no incapacitation
effect during those years for an offender who would have received a
prison term extending into 1997 in the absence of Three Strikes. But
ies committed with firearms).
73. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 59.
74. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 339 tbl.3.130 (Kath-
leen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996); see also Alfred Blumstein &
Daniel Cork, Linking Gun Availability to Youth Gun Violence, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 15, 23 (1996) (studying homicide victimization rates fom
1968-1991 for African-Americans and Whites of various ages).
75. Cf DANIEL KESSLER & STEVEN D. LEvITr, USING SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENTS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND
INCAPACITATION 2 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
6484, 1998) (stating initial impact of sentence enhancements is entirely deter-
rence because the criminal is already required to serve the basic sentence).
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the overwhelming majority of offenders incarcerated by Three
Strikes would have received a prison term extending into 1997 in any
case.
The enhanced penalties mandated by Three Strikes only apply to
offenders convicted of a current felony who have one or more prior
convictions for a felony qualifying as a strike. Approximately 60%
of third strike76 and 35% of second strike offenses 77 are violent or
serious felonies such as murder, robbery, rape or burglary. Almost
all of these offenders would have received substantial prison terms
extending into 1997 and beyond even without Three Strikes. The
mean time served for offenders released in 1994 was 32.3 months for
robbery, 27.4 months for assault and battery, and 21.8 months for
burglary. 78 The non-serious, non-violent felonies that qualified as
second and third strike cases were comprised mostly of theft (ap-
proximately 20%), drug offenses (30%), and weapons possession
(7%).79 The mean time served for drug crimes generally exceeded 20
months while mean sentences for theft offenses and weapons charges
were about 15 months.80 Since these averages include time served by
offenders with no prior felony convictions, it is likely that the time
served by offenders with one or more prior serious or violent felonies
would be longer. But even if only the average sentences were im-
posed, most felons convicted under Three Strikes in 1994 and early
76. As of July 31, 1998, 38.7% of third strike cases were for violent felo-
nies such as murder, manslaughter, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon,
sexual assaults and kidnapping, while 18.9% were for the serious felony of
burglary. See THIRD STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra note 10.
77. As of the end of July 1998, 19.2% of second strike cases were for vio-
lent felonies such as murder, manslaughter, robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon, sexual assaults and kidnapping, while 13.4% were for the serious fel-
ony of burglary. See SECOND STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra note
10.
78. See PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1993 & 1994, supra note 38, at 124-25
tbl.54A. Median sentences were slightly shorter: 25.6 months for robbery,
21.1 months for assault and battery, and 15.2 months for burglary.
79. Percentage calculations based on the combined total of 36,043 second
strike cases and 4,468 third strike cases as of the end of July 1998. See
SECOND STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra note 10 (providing data on
second strikes); THIRD STRIKE CASES BY DELIVERY DATE, supra note 10 (pro-
viding data on third strikes).
80. See PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1993 & 1994, supra note 38, at 124-125
tbl.54A.
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1995, and all felons convicted in 1996 and late 1995, would have
been imprisoned until 1997 or longer even without Three Strikes.
Although Three Strikes had little incapacitation effect in the pe-
riod from 1994-1996, it will have a larger impact in the future.
Repeat offenders who would have been released under prior law will
remain in prison under the longer sentences mandated by Three
Strikes. Thus, Three Strikes will prevent the crimes that those of-
fenders would have committed if released.8' Unfortunately,
however, Three Strikes may mandate 25-years-to-life sentences for
aging, non-violent offenders near the end of their criminal careers.
While imprisoning such offenders will prevent some crimes, a
greater reduction could be achieved by using the prison space to in-
capacitate younger, more violent offenders.
82
Prevention programs may be an even less costly way to reduce
crime. A RAND study, for example, examined programs sponsored
by the Ford Foundation that offered modest cash and scholarship in-
centives to encourage disadvantaged youth to graduate from high
school.83 The study found that the graduate incentives were several
81. A RAND simulation conducted shortly after the legislature passed the
Three Strikes law found that, if fully implemented, the Three Strikes law
would lead to a large expansion of the prison population. See PETER W.
GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT:
ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MANDATORY
SENTENCING LAW 25-30 (1994) [hereinafter RAND CORP., ESTIMATED
BENEFITS AND COSTS]. RAND found that this expansion would reduce serious
felonies by adults "between 22 and 34 percent below what would have oc-
curred had the previous law remained in effect." Id. at xii.
Incapacitation will reduce crime only if the imprisoned offender is not re-
,placed by a riew offender. For most offenses, this is a reasonable assumption.
New offenders, however, may quickly replace offenders imprisoned for mar-
ket-driven crimes such as drug dealing. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME 146 (rev. ed. 1983).
82. A RAND study, for example, concluded that sentencing all offenders
convicted of serious or violent felonies, including those without prior strikes,
to prison terms without good-time credits would reduce serious crime as much
as Three Strikes at a substantially smaller cost. See RAND CORP., ESTIMATED
BENEFITS AND COSTS, supra note 81, at 25-30. For an analysis of the inca-
pacitation effects of habitual offender statutes generally, see Linda S. Beres &
Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender
Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103 (1998).
83. See PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., RAND CORP., DIVERTING
CHILDREN FROM A LIFE OF CRIME: MEASURING COSTS AND BENEFITS 25-26
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times more effective than Three Strikes, per dollar spent, in prevent-
ing serious crime.
84
B. Deterrence
If Three Strikes did not reduce crime through incapacitation,
perhaps it did so through deterrence. The enhanced prison terms of
Three Strikes were well publicized, and there is some scholarly evi-
dence that tougher penalties can deter crime. 5 However, while
Three Strikes may have had some deterrent effect, the pattern of
crime reduction suggests it was not a major cause of the recent drop
in crime.
1. Demographics
The average age of offenders in second strike cases was 33,6
and the average age in third strike cases was 36.87 This makes sense,
because older offenders would be more likely than younger offenders
to have been convicted of prior felonies qualifying as strikes. Thus
(1998).
84. The cost per serious crime prevented was $3,881 for graduation incen-
tives and $16,000 for Three Strikes. See id.
85. The deterrent impact of a harsher sanction will be effective only if po-
tential offenders are aware of it. The widespread publicity surrounding Three
Strikes makes plausible that a significant portion of potential offenders were
aware of the measure.
The scholarly evidence of the deterrent effect of harsher sentences is
mixed. In its base estimates of the effects of Three Strikes, RAND argued that
assuming no deterrent effect was "consistent with recent research." RAND
CORP., ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS, supra note 81, at 16. A significant
number of studies, however, have found some deterrent effect from punish-
ment. For a survey of the research and a discussion of the methodological
problems in measuring deterrence, see Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and
the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996). For a recent study
finding longer sentences to have a non-trivial deterrent impact, see Kessler &
Levitt, supra note 75.
86. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
SECOND STRIKE CASES: PROC UNIVARIATE ON AVERAGE AGE AT ADMISSION
OF STRIKE CASE (July 31, 1998).
87. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
THIRD STRIKE CASES: PROC UNIVARIATE ON AVERAGE AGE AT ADMISSION OF
STRIKE CASE (July 31, 1998).
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Three Strikes should have the largest deterrent effect on offenders
over the age of 30.88
For homicide crimes, however, the actual results were the re-
verse. The drop in homicide crimes was concentrated in persons un-
der the age of 20.89 Indeed, the largest percentage drop occurred in
the 10-17 age classification, persons seldom subject to the enhanced
prison terms of Three Strikes.
9 0
For non-homicide felonies, the decline is less concentrated
among younger persons. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that
older offenders who are more likely to face the enhanced penalties of
Three Strikes are being deterred more than younger offenders. From
1993 to 1996, the total felony rate fell by 11% in the 10-20 age
group, 8% in the 20-29 age group, 1% in the 30-39 age group, and
rose 15% in the 40-69 age group. 91 During the same period, the
violent felony rate fell by 3% in the 10-20 age group, 1% in the 20-
29 age group, 2% in the 30-39 age group, and rose 17% in the 40-69
age group.
92
It is particularly interesting to examine the impact of Three
Strikes on felony theft. Theft does not qualify as a prior strike, but
the penalty for theft can be sharply enhanced if the offender has one
or more prior strikes.93 For this reason, Three Strikes should have
88. Three Strikes could have some deterrent effect on young offenders
afraid of obtaining a first strike, but the impact should be greater on older of-
fenders with prior strikes who face sharply enhanced sentences if convicted
again.
89. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
90. Only about 1% of second strike cases and 0.3% of third strike cases in-
volve offenders under the age of 20. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA
DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, SECOND STRIKE CASES BY SEX AND AGE GROUP AT
ADMISSION OF STRIKE CASE (July 31, 1998) (author's calculations); DATA
ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, THIRD STRIKE CASES
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP AT ADMISSION OF STRIKE CASE (July 31, 1998).
91. Authors' calculation of offense rates using crime data from CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, supra note 20, and using population data from DEMOGRAPHIC
RESEARCH UNIT, supra note 69.
92. Id.
93. Upon conviction for any felony, an offender with one prior strike will
have his sentence doubled, while an offender with two prior strikes will receive
a sentence of 25-years-to-life. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12. Since
petty theft can be filed as a felony if the offender has a prior felony conviction,
an individual with two prior strikes could receive a 25-years-to-life sentence
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the greatest deterrent effect on theft by older offenders who have
prior strikes, but have no impact on theft by younger offenders with-
out prior strikes. In fact, however, the drop in the felony theft rate
was slightly greater among the young, falling by 10% in the 10-20
age group, 8% in the 20-29 age group, 8% in the 30-39 age group,
and 1% in the 40-69 age group.
94
2. Offense Patterns
The harshest sentence enhancements in third strike cases fall on
offenders convicted of less serious felonies. For an offender con-
victed of a third violent felony, such as homicide, the Three Strikes
enhancements mean little because the offender would have been
sentenced to a lengthy prison term in any case. On the other hand, for
an offender convicted of a relatively minor felony like petty theft or
possession of a controlled substance, the minimum 25-years-to-life
sentence required by Three Strikes would be much longer than the
sentence the offender otherwise would have received. The additional
deterrent value of Three Strikes, therefore, should be smaller for
homicide than for less serious felonies such as burglary, motor vehi-
cle theft, or assault.
The actual decline in crime, however, was greater for homicides
than for lesser offenses. The AGR notes that the homicide rate
dropped 40.2% during the "Three Strikes era," while the burglary
rate dropped 32.1%, motor vehicle theft rate dropped 33.2%, and as-
sault rate dropped only 19.2%. 95
VI. EXPLAINING RECENT HOMICIDE TRENDS
In order to understand the drop in crime after 1993, it is neces-
sary to explain the crime explosion that preceded it. The trend in
homicide is particularly important to analyze, both because of the se-
riousness of the offense and because homicide has been more volatile
than other offenses. As noted in Part IV, the sharp rise in homicide
in the late 1980s was mostly due to young urban offenders with
for stealing a pair of pants. However, Three Strikes does not increase the pen-
alty for petty theft for an offender with no prior strikes.
94. See supra note 91.
95. See AGR, supra note 4, at 2.
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handguns. At the same time, homicides committed by older offend-
ers and by offenders without guns declined.96
A. Crack Cocaine and the Rise in Youth Homicide
A plausible explanation for the sharp rise in youth handgun
homicides in the late 1980s centers on emergent crack cocaine mar-
kets in the mid-1980s.97 Crack cocaine has greater bulk than powder
cocaine, and thus can be sold in single "hits" for a price of five to ten
dollars rather than the hundreds of dollars needed to purchase powder
cocaine.9 8 This lower price led to an expansion of the cocaine mar-
ket to poorer individuals unable to afford powder cocaine.
99
The larger market and the needs of poorer customers to make
numerous small purchases resulted in a large expansion of the need
for sellers. 100 Many of these new sellers were juveniles who were
more willing to take risks, and who faced less severe penalties if
convicted than would adults. 10 The ability to recruit young African-
Americans and Hispanics was helped by the lack of legitimate jobs in
the urban areas where they resided.
10 2
Drug sellers face a high risk of theft and often rely on handguns
for protection103 A significant portion of the youth involved in drug
sales, therefore, may have become armed with handguns. 10 4 No more
than a fraction of the rise in youth handgun homicide, however, can
be explained by the recruitment of adolescent drug sellers. But the
increased use of handguns by some adolescents may have led others
96. See supra Part IV.
97. The following discussion of the connection between crack cocaine and
youth homicide relies extensively on Blumstein & Cork, supra note 74, at 9-
10; see also Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug In-
dustry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995); Blumstein & Rosenfeld,
supra note 59; Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes
on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (1996); Dono-
hue, supra note 72.
98. See Blumstein & Cork supra, note 74, at 9.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 10.
101. See id.
102. See id. For an analysis of the lack of work opportunities in the inner
city and its consequences, see WILSON, supra note 48.
103. See Blumstein & Cork, supra note 74, at 10.
104. See id. at 10-11.
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to acquire guns either for protection or as a status symbol10 5 Fight-
ing and other reckless behavior has always been common among
male adolescents.10 6 It would not be surprising, then, for widespread
ownership of handguns by juveniles to produce a sharp increase in
youth homicide.
B. The Recent Decline in Youth Homicides
It is likely that several factors underlie the recent sharp drop in
crime in general, and in youth homicide in particular. 10 7 One ele-
ment, as noted earlier, may be a growing economy that improved le-
gitimate job opportunities for at-risk youth.'08 Another reason may
be the decline in the crack cocaine epidemic in the 1990s.
10 9
More effective police programs may also have been important-
especially those that remove guns from juveniles. These programs
included more energetic enforcement of loitering and anti-graffiti
laws, and more aggressive stop-and-frisk policies, especially in high
violence neighborhoods.1 0  A growth in community programs
105. See id. at 11; see also Beth Bjerregaard & Alan J. Lizotte, Gun Owner-
ship and Gang Membership, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 37, 50 (1995)
(noting juveniles who have peers who own guns are more likely to own a gun
than are those without such peers).
106. See Blumstein & Cork, supra note 74, at 11 (citing DELBERT S.
ELLIOTT ET AL., MULTIPLE PROBLEM YOUTH: DELINQUENCY, SUBSTANCE
ABUSE, AND MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS (1989)).
107. For an excellent collection of articles analyzing the recent drop in
crime, see SYMPOSIUM, Why Is Crime Decreasing?, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998).
108. See RAND CORP., ESTIMATED BENEFITS AND COSTS, supra note 81;
see also Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 59.
109. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 59; Donohue, supra note 72.
110. More effective enforcement of nuisance offenses has been credited with
helping to reduce crime in some California communities. See, e.g., Joe Vargo,
Community Policing Gets Praise, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (RIVERSIDE, CA.), May
14, 1998 at B1, available in 1998 WL 12001627.
Aggressive enforcement of nuisance offenses was also a key part of the
approach taken by the New York City Police Department. See George L. Kel-
ling & William J. Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New
York City Story, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 1998). The
NYPD also greatly expanded the size of its force. See AGR, supra note 4, at
5. The highly aggressive enforcement by the NYPD has been criticized as
leading to the violation of civil liberties and to an increase in police brutality
complaints. See Dan Morrison, Report: Police Misconduct Up, Complaints
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designed to prevent violence and to give juveniles a constructive al-
ternative to delinquent behavior also may have played a significant
role in the drop in crime."1 Many of these programs have developed
through the joint efforts of police departments, neighborhood
churches, and civic leaders.
112
It also seems fair to give some credit to the adolescents them-
selves. When violent crimes increase among youth, commentators
are quick to attribute the rise to a culture of violence and poor moral
values, and to warn of an emerging wave of youthful "stone-cold
predators."113 But when violent crime drops, commentators seldom
credit youth with strong moral values and a commitment to reduce
violence. 
114
Doubled Since 1992, NEWSDAY, Sept. 11, 1997, at A29 (noting the more than
doubling of complaints of police misconduct in nine precincts from 1992-
1996); R-E-S-P-E-C-T Cops Must Fight Crime And Be Civil, NEWSDAY, Apr.
12, 1995, at A28 (noting rise in citizen complaints and lack of supervision of
police conduct).
111. Such programs may have played a role in reducing crime in some Cali-
fornia cities. See, e.g., Ronald J. Ostrow & Steve Carney, Crime Dips 15% in
7 Largest O.C. Cities, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at BI (crediting after-school
programs designed to keep kids out of trouble); see also discussion of Boston
approach to crime control infra pp. 127-30.
112. For examples of such partnership in California see Ostrow & Carney,
supra note 111 (discussing Santa Ana, Los Angeles and Fullerton); Vivianne
Wightman, Crime Rate Hits New Low, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Nov. 6,
1997, at 1 (discussing Placentia); Vargo, supra note 110 (discussing River-
side); see also infra notes 143-151 and accompanying text (discussing Bos-
ton's approach to crime control). For a discussion of the contribution of
neighborhood association to crime prevention, see Warren Friedman, Volun-
teerism and the Decline of Violent Crime, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 1998).
113. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime and Public
Policy, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 7-8 (1996).
114. An exception is Boston Police Commissioner Paul F. Evans who has
stated, "[I]n a sense, it's the kids who deserve the most credit. They are the
ones who saw their older siblings become victims of violence and have hope-
fully chosen a different way." Daniel Vasquez, Credit Abounds for Drop in
Killings, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1998, at B1. In a recent survey, almost
90% of teenagers surveyed indicated that they would be willing to participate
in community programs to prevent crime and violence. See Michael Doyle &
Cyndee Fontant, Students Say They Want To Help, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 12, 1996
atB3.
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C. Decline in Adult Homicides
Nationwide homicide arrests of adults generally have been de-
clining since the early 1980s.11 In California, homicide arrests of
individuals age 30 and older declined slightly between 1986 and
1990, and then averaged a 5% annual decline from 1990 to 1996.116
The reasons for the decline in adult homicides are uncertain.
One likely factor, however, is the incapacitation of a large number of
older potential offenders." 7 The California inmate population sky-
rocketed from 24,569 in 1980 to 125,605 in 1994-more than a
400% increase."18 These inmates are generally older offenders. The
median age is 32, and only 1.4% of the inmates are under the age of
20.119 Moreover, the California inmate population is aging. In 1984
the median age of inmates was only 29, and inmates under age 20
made up 4.9% of the population, more than three times the percent-
age in 1994.120
Another reason for the decline in adult homicides may be a drop
in the homicide of intimate partners.' 21 One reason for the decline in
intimate partner homicide may be lower marriage rates, increased age
at marriage, and higher divorce rates. 122 Another reason may be the
growth of domestic violence services.'
23
115. See Blumstein & Cork, supra note 74, at 22 fig.7; see also Blumstein &
Rosenfeld, supra note 59.
116. See CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 20.
117. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld, supra note 59.
118. See PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 1993 & 1994, supra note 38, at 35 tbl.6.
119. See id. at 45 tbl.12. The nationwide median age of prisoners is similar
to that of California. See Blumstein & Rosenfield, supra note 59.
120. See DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
CALIFORNIA PRISONERS & PAROLEES 1989, at 124 tbl.22 (giving 1984 age
data).
121. See Blumstein & Rosenfeld supra note 59 (citing LAWRENCE A.
GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE BY INTIMATES (1998)).
122. See id. (citing Richard Rosenfeld, Changing Relationships Between
Men and Women: A Note on the Decline in Intimate Partner Homicide, I
HOMICIDE STUD. 72-83 (1997)).
123. See id. (citing Laura Dugan et al., Explaining the Decline in Intimate
Partner Homicide: The Effects of Changing Domesticity, Women's Status, and
Domestic Violence Resources (1997) (Working Paper, National Consortium
on Violence Research).
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VII. COMPARING CALIFORNIA'S CRIME DROP TO OTHER STATES
The AGR points out that between 1994 and 1997 the crime rate
in California dropped more rapidly than in the rest of the nation.
124
The AGR notes that overall crime dropped 30.8% compared to a
drop of 17.4% in the rest of the nation. 125 Violent crime dropped
26.9% compared to 18.2% in other states. 126 Homicide dropped by
over 40% in California compared to a drop of less than 30% else-
where. 127 The difference is misleading, however, because the drop in
violent crime, particularly homicide, was greatest among urban mi-
nority youth. Thus, states with large urban minority populations
were likely to show a disproportionate drop in crime.
The drop in homicide rates in California's large cities, while im-
pressive, is not dissimilar to that of large cities nationwide. Four of
the nation's fifteen largest cities in 1996 are located in California.
128
For these California cities, the homicide rate dropped 34% from
1993-1996 and 15% from 1994-1996.129 In the eleven non-
California cities among the top fifteen, the homicide rate dropped
30% from 1993-1996 and 24% from 1994-1996.
The AGR notes that California was one of only three states to
record a "double digit" drop in the major crime categories from 1993
to 1996.130 The two states to experience a larger drop than California
124. See AGR, supra note 4, at 4.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. The cities are Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, San Francisco.
Population rankings and crime rates were calculated by the authors from data
obtained from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME
& JUSTICE ELECTRONIC DATA ABSTRACTS (last visited Oct. 27, 1998)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm> [hereinafter CRIME AND ARREST
DATA]. The data in the electronic data abstract is compiled from a variety of
published governmental sources and presented in spreadsheets in order to fa-
cilitate use with statistical programs and analytical software.
129. See id. The Bureau of Justice Statistics city homicide data for 1997 was
not available.
130. See AGR, supra note 4, at 4. Again the city-to-city comparison is less
impressive. Several large cities, including New York, San Antonio, and Seat-
tle have had greater than 40% drops in homicide from 1993-1996. The change
in homicide rates were calculated from CRIMES AND ARREST DATA, supra note
128.
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were New York and Massachusetts.1 3 1 It is worthwhile, then, to ex-
amine these states more closely.
The AGR states that New York has a persistent offender statute
similar to California's Three Strikes. 132 The New York statute, first
enacted in 1978, was amended in October 1995 to double the mini-
mum sentence previously mandated for "persistent violent offenders"
convicted of a further violent felony.133 For persistent violent of-
fenders convicted of a class B violent felony, such as first-degree
robbery or aggravated sexual assault, the new minimum sentence was
20 years.
The drop in crime in New York, however, began in 1991, five
years before the passage of tougher penalties. 34 In addition, the New
York statute is more narrowly drawn than Three Strikes. Unlike the
California statute, which applies to convictions for nonviolent of-
fenses if the offender has prior strikes, the New York statute only ap-
plies if the current offense is violent. 3 5 Moreover, the mandatory
minimum 20-year sentence only applies to the most serious violent
felonies. 36 In our examination of dozens of articles and newspaper
reports on the decline in crime in New York, we have been unable to
find anyone who attributes the drop in crime to its persistent violent
offender statute. 137 Substantial attention, on the other hand, has been
given to the change in policing practices by the NYPD.
131. See AGR, supra note 4, at 4.
132. See id.
133. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (Consol. Supp. 1997).
134. See CRIME IN THE U.S. 1996, supra note 18. In 1994, the year before
the enactment of increased penalties, overall crime dropped 8.7% and violent
crime dropped 10.1%. In 1995, when the stiffer penalties were in effect for the
three months, overall crime dropped 10.1% and violent crime dropped 12.8%.
In 1996, when the stiffer penalties were in effect for the entire year, overall
crime dropped 9.4% and violent crime dropped 13.6%. See id.
135. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (Consol. Supp. 1997).
136. Persistent violent offenders convicted of class C violent felonies, such
as second-degree robbery or burglary, face a mandatory minimum of 16 years
and offenders convicted of class D violent felonies, such as criminal sale of a
firearm with the aid of a minor, face a mandatory minimum of 12 years. See
id. §§ 70.02, 70.08.
137. Like other felony sentence enhancements, the amendment to the New
York statute would have little or no incapacitation effect in its first few years.
Thus any impact on the crime rate would be through deterrence. See supra
Part V-A.
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This change, as noted by the AGR, involved a major expansion
of the police force with an aggressive approach to the prosecution of
nuisance crimes such as "loitering, solicitation, and panhandling."'
138
It is unclear what portion of the remarkable drop in New York City
crime was due to the policing changes and what portion was due to
changes in the drug market and other social factors. Nevertheless,
the size and timing of the drop makes it likely that the change in po-
lice practice was a significant factor in the decline.
139
As in California, the drop in New York City homicides was
largely due to a decline in gun-related killings.140 Police stops, justi-
fied on the grounds of preventing nuisances, increased the opportu-
nity to make gun-related searches. 141 Increased gun searches may
have reduced gun-related offenses by allowing police to confiscate
illegal guns, arrest those who carried them, and deter people from
carrying such weapons in the first place.
142
The drop in the Massachusetts crime rate was led by the city of
Boston. Homicides in Boston dropped from a peak of 143 homicides
in 1990 to 59 homicides in 1996. Robberies dropped to a 26-year
low, and armed assaults dropped to a 10-year low.143 The Boston
approach combines more effective policing with a variety of commu-
nity development and prevention programs. One of the most praised
programs was Operation Night Light, where probation officers, ac-
companied by police, would visit youths on probation in their homes.
In addition to dramatically reducing probation violations, Operation
Night Light also enabled probation officers to work with the young
offenders' families. The emphasis of the program was "on seeing
people in their home environment, not challenging them on the street
or arresting them."'
144
138. See AGR, supra note 4, at 4.
139. See Fagan et al., supra note 72.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. The decline in New York City homicide was "much more consistent
with gun-oriented policing than with indiscriminate quality-of-life interven-
tions." Id.
143. See Charles A. Radin, Reaching Up Against Crime, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 19, 1997, atAl.
144. Id. (quoting commander of Operation Night Light strike force Gary
French); see also Alan Lupo, Keeping the Night Light On: Probation Officers
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Boston also aggressively targeted violent gang leaders for prose-
cution, destroyed gang graffiti, razed derelict buildings used as hang-
outs, and cleaned and fenced vacant lots.145 Working together, fed-
eral and state law enforcement officials arrested gang leaders on both
state and federal drug charges.
146
The Boston program also included successful efforts to improve
relations between police and the community. Police actively worked
with community leaders and churches to better police-community
relations and to provide youth programs and job assistance to get at-
risk youth off the streets.
147
The Boston approach has been hailed nationally and copied by
other cities. 48 Despite this praise, Boston Police Commissioner Paul
F. Evans warned that no program offers a simple solution to crime:
"Anyone who comes into a city like this and looks for one central
cause just doesn't get it.' 49 He noted that it was important to under-
stand problems from the point of view of neighborhood residents and
to develop comprehensive solutions to problems of youth violence.15
0
"The thing that's working is not just lock 'em up, lock 'em up.''
VIII. CONCLUSION
When crime goes up, government officials usually blame the rise
on factors beyond their control such as a disintegration of the family,
violent television or video games, or increased drug use. But, when
crime goes down, those same officials are quick to claim the credit.
Work Late Shifts Making Sure Their Clients Don't Stray, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
26, 1997, at 1 (describing Operation Night Light); Interview by Barbara Bo-
gaer with Night Light Probation Officer William Stewart and Judge Sydney
Hanlon (FRESH AIR, NPR, Apr. 22, 1998), available in 1998 WL 2923655.
145. See Radin, supra note 143, at Al.
146. See id.
147. See id,
148. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Looking to Boston for Homicide Solutions
Beset by Violent Street Crime, Minneapolis Copies an Intervention Plan,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3, 1997, at Al (describing Minneapolis's adoption of
Boston's approach and noting that dozens of cities are also planning to imitate
it); Clinton Lauds Boston for Juvenile Crime Reduction, NATION'S CITIES
WEEKLY, Mar. 3, 1997, at 3.
149. Radin, supra note 143.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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And sometimes, officials try to have it both ways. When most crime
statistics dropped in 1993, but the murder rate increased, California's
Attorney General claimed that the state's tougher approach to crimi-
nals was responsible for the general decline, but that "the glamoriz-
ing of violent behavior in movies, music, video games and profes-
sional sports" was to blame for the increase in homicides. 152 It was
not surprising, therefore, that the same Attorney General now claims
the Three Strikes policy he has championed is largely responsible for
the recent sharp drop in crime.
Government reports on important and complex legislation
should be balanced and fair. Unfortunately, the Attorney General's
report is a brief in favor of Three Strikes rather than a serious analy-
sis of the measure.
152. Paul Jacobs, State's Crime Rate Fell in 1993 as Public's Fear Rose,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1994, at A3.
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